UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26726*
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to refer to your statement of 9 November on behalf of the Security Council (S/26717). In that statement, the Security Council requests that a report be submitted without delay on the incident on 8 November 1993 involving the taking hostage by Bosnian Serb forces of two persons travelling in armoured vehicles of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

In response to the above request, please find attached an extensive report submitted to me by UNPROFOR.

I am pleased to inform you that, following intensive negotiations under the direct supervision of my Special Representative, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the two persons concerned were released on 11 November 1993 at 1300 hours local time.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

INCIDENT REPORT

Incident at Rajlovac, 8 November 1993

I. GENERAL

1. The incident in question occurred when Serbs stopped an UNPROFOR convoy escorting a party of Bosnian Croat VIPs to Vares at the request of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government, resulting in two escorted persons being taken from the convoy.

2. A number of reports and summaries of this incident have been prepared and are attached to the present report (see appendices I-VIII). The purpose of the present report is to present a total picture of the event.

II. NARRATIVE

3. On 6 November 1993, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government requested, by telephone, transportation and escort of a delegation of Catholic churchmen from Sarajevo to Vares. At 1514 hours on that same day, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a facsimile (see appendix I) specifying that the mission was confidence-building to try to restore peace in Vares and detailing the passenger list (all Croats) as follows:

(a) Monsignor Vinko Puljic (in later documents identified as Archbishop of Sarajevo);

(b) Fra Petar Andjelovic;

(c) Fra Ljubo Lucic;

(d) Ivo Tomasevic (in later documents identified as a clergyman with the same honorific (His Highness) as Puljic);

(e) Ferdo Dejanovic, Security;

(f) Jozo Andzic, Security.

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina Command then became involved in telephone conversations with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry and the Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Mladic, to arrange the mission. While Mladic gave approval in principle, he wanted the names of the party before final approval. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Command provided the names through the Bosnian Serb Army Liaison Officer at Lukavica (Major Indic), and through the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Officer at Pale.

5. During this period of communication, at 1135 hours on 7 November, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command sent a facsimile (see appendix II) to Sector Sarajevo, instructing them to conduct the mission on 8 November 1993. The facsimile specified that the escort would include two armoured personnel carriers (APCs), would take the Rajlovac-Ilijas-Breza-Vares route and would remain in Vares until the departure of the party.

6. After receipt of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command facsimile, Sector Sarajevo sent a facsimile (see appendix III) at 1500 hours on 7 November tasking French Battalion 2 to conduct the VIP escort. The facsimile repeated the details given in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command facsimile.

7. Bosnian Serb Army clearance for the mission (see appendix IV) was received by the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Officer at Pale at 2300 hours and by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command at 2311 hours on 7 November. The clearance is noted in the United Nations Military Observer Capsat message as being from the Bosnian Serb Army Chief of Staff
Brigadier General Manojlo Milovanovic and signed by Colonel Magazin. It further specified that a Bosnian Serb Army APC would accompany the convoy through Bosnian Serb Army territory and would require 150 litres of fuel, the delivery of which was to be arranged.

8. On receiving the Bosnian Serb Army clearance, Bosnia and Herzegovina Command sent the message at appendix V, which confirmed that the clearance had been received and confirmed the tasking. The message stated that the escort was to be done in accordance with normal standard operating procedures.

9. At 0800 hours on 8 November 1993, Lieutenant Bournel of French Battalion 2 left the Presidency with the passengers and an escort of two APCs (VAB, or armoured forward-area vehicle, type), each with six soldiers. Both "security" men were in the rear APC. A light armoured reconnaissance vehicle was the escort commander's vehicle.

10. The convoy passed a Bosnia and Herzegovina checkpoint at 0820 hours with some difficulty, which may have been due to an apparent ignorance of the clearance on the part of the local commander.

11. Arriving at the Serb checkpoint at Rajlovac at 0845 hours, the convoy stopped and presented identification cards via the windows of the vehicles. The Serbs at the checkpoint refused to permit the convoy to proceed, initially citing the request for APC fuel mentioned above. During this period another VAB arrived but stopped under cover short of the checkpoint.

12. After the convoy had been stopped for 20 minutes, the battalion commander ordered the convoy to return to the unit. At this point, a number of Serbs (some armed with anti-armour weapons) and vehicles moved into position, preventing the French vehicles from moving.

13. Within 10 minutes (by 0915 hours), discussions began which revealed that the Serbs believed two of the passengers (Dejanovic and Andzic) to be war criminals. The Serbs repeatedly demanded the surrender of these two individuals, threatening to destroy the APCs if denied. Between 0915 and 1200 hours, further reinforcements, including additional anti-armour weapons,

arrived. Negotiations were also taking place involving the troops on the ground as well as battalion and sector groups. This resulted in the removal of the anti-armour weapons.

14. From 1200 hours, tensions appeared to reduce further as a result of talks involving Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale and Bosnia and Herzegovina Command Headquarters.

15. The situation became tense again from around 1500 hours as the delay in solution continued and night approached. The Serbs demanded again that the persons be surrendered.

16. At about 1530 hours, the Serbs began to threaten the escort commander and other soldiers with pistols to support their demands. Also during this period, Bosnia and Herzegovina Command requested UNPROFOR assistance in negotiating the release of the convoy.

17. The escort commander, in a final communication with his battalion at 1545 hours, was told again not to open the doors but to continue talking.

18. Excitement at the checkpoint rose, demands were repeated, and Serb irregular reinforcements arrived. Between 1600 and 1620 hours, the Serbs forced their way with crowbars into the APC containing the two men they wanted and took them away in a car.

19. The convoy was then ordered to return to the unit and was permitted to do so.

20. Despite a statement to the contrary by President Milosovic at 1840 hours on 8 November 1993, both men continue to be held to this time.

21. It has recently been learned that the Serbs have offered to release both men to the custody of UNPROFOR providing that UNPROFOR holds them pending trial for war crimes. UNPROFOR intends to accept them and hand them over to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government for trial.

Appendix I

Request for escort from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sarajevo, 06 November 1995
No: 05-1927/95

UNPROFOR
BH Command
Sarajevo

att: General Francise Briquemont
Commander

VERY URGENT

Dear General,

We would like to inform you that the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has made a decision to send the Delegation to Vares in regard of returning the confidention among the citizens of Vares.
The following are the members of the Delegation:

1. Monsignor Vinko Puljic
2. Fra Petar Andjelovic
3. Fra Ljubo Lucic
4. Ivo Tomasevic
5. Ferdo Delanovic - Security
6. Jozo Andzic - Security

We kindly request the transportation of the above mentioned delegation from Sarajevo to Vares - Kiseljak and back to Sarajevo, tomorrow, Sunday, 07 November 1995, starting at 08,00 o'clock a.m. from Sarajevo (Presidential building), in the mission of bringing back the peace in the city of Vares, after the latest events.

We kindly ask you to provide the safe transportation for this delegation on mentioned route, being aware of the importance of this mission.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Co: Mr. Victor Andreev
UNPROFOR Civil Affairs
BH Head of Office

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Appendix II

Initial Bosnia and Herzegovina Command instructions to Sector Sarajevo

Q BH COMMAND MAIN OFFICE OF COS

age 1 of 1

~~ROUTINE/PRIORITY~~ (IMMEDIATE) ~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~/
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ (UN RESTRICTED) ~~UN CONFIDENTIAL SECRET~~

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 071135A NOV 93
TO: SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK
ATTN: COS	FILE REF.NO. : CG/(0:9/93) DRAFTER : RAMSAY TITLE : COS RELEASING OFF. : RAMSAY SIGNATURE :
INFO : HQ BHC FWD SARAJEVO (AA/COMD)	
INTERNAL DIST: ACOS G3, G5, CAC	
SUBJECT: BIH VIP MOVEMENT SARAJEVO - VARES	

MESSAGE

1. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to send a delegation to Vares with the aim of building confidence among the citizens of Vares. The members of the delegation are as follows:

a. Monsignor VINKO PULJIC.-

b. Fra PETAR ANDJELOVIC.

c. Fra LJUBO LUCIC.

d. IVO TOMASEVIC.

e. FERDO DELALOVIC.

f. JOZO ANDJIC.

2. Please arrange 2 x APC at 180800 Nov at the Presidential building to collect 6 persons for move to Vares and return. The move from Sarajevo will be via the RAJLOVAC - ILIJAS - BRDA - VARES route. APC's will remain with the delegation and return to Sarajevo by 190Chrs.

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Appendix III

Sector Sarajevo instructions to French Battalion 2

UNPROFOR

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/CNLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE: 07 1500A NOV 93
TO: FREBAT2.	FROM: SHQ SARAJEVO
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: CPs OFFR.	DRAFTER : CAP ROUX TITLE : DSOO RELEASE OFFR: SOO LCL DUBOIS SIGNATURE :
INFO INTERNAL: SC. DSC. COS. SOO. BH CMD LO. CIVIL AFFAIRS.	
SUBJECT: VIP Transportation . BiH VIP MOVEMENT SARAJEVO VARES CLT 201.44	

MESSAGE

1. MISSION
SECTOR SARAJEVO HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT OF AN OFFICIAL BiH DELEGATION.

2. EXECUTION:
21. TIMING:
211. DATE OF MISSION: 08th NOV 93.
a) TIME OF RENDEZ VOUS: 0800A
b) RENDEZ VOUS POINT: PRESIDENCY
c) TRANSPORT BETWEEN: PRESIDENCY - VARES and back.
d) ESTIMATED TIME OF END OF MISSION: 1900A
e) ROUTE: RAJLOVAC - ILIJAS - BREZA - VARES

22. FREBAT2 WILL PROVIDE ESCORT AND TRANSPORTATION MEANS FOR THIS MISSION. THE VOLUME OF ASSETS WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE HQ OPS ROOM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

23. THE MISSION COMMANDER WILL BE PROVIDED BY : FREBAT2

3. LIST OF DELEGATES:
SEE IN ADDED ANNEX.

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Appendix IV

Clearance from the Bosnian Serb Army

IN.218 Page 1 UTC Time: 93-11-07 22:32:13

MC DUMUM LCO 4931972F6-FOJA X 7-NOV-1993 22:21:58 220056

TO: UNMO SECTOR HQ
FROM: UNMO LO-PALE

DTG 072311 A NOV 93

RECEIVED FOLLOWING LETTER FROM MILOVANOVIC AT 072300 A NOV 93

HEADQUARTERS OF THE
S.R. ARMY
No: 17/230-608
November 7, 1993

U R G E N T

TO: UNPROFOR COMMAND - KISELJAK

Reference your letter be informed that we have approved the following:

1. Movement of the convoy from Bijeljina to Sarajevo on November 8, 1993.

2. Transport of the delegation of the Catholic Church led by Vinko Puljic, from Sarajevo to Vareš, to take place on November 8, 1993, by your vehicle.
Your vehicles will be escorted by an APC through the territory of the Republic of Srpska. It is necessary to provide 150 liters of fuel for that escorting vehicle.
The place of delivery of fuel you will discuss with the LO in the Kiseljak barracks.

CHIEF OF STAFF
Brigadier General
Manojlo Milovanovic
SIGNED BY
Colonel Mogatin

IN.218

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Appendix V

Bosnia and Herzegovina Command confirmation to Sector Sarajevo

HQ BiH COMMAND (MAIN) KISELJAK

Page 1 of 1

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING FAX NO. 302.	DATE TIME: 0° 1903A NOV 93
TO. SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: BH COMD MAIN KISELJAK MAJ CROSER DEPUTY CHIEF OPS SIGNATURE:
FAX NO	FAX NO 873*30*522/1522(INMARSAT)
ATTN. SENIOR OPS OFFICER	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER MAJ CROSER
INFO BH: HQ FAX NO	
SUBJECT. MOVE OF BIH VIPs TO VARES FROM SARAJEVO	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: COS G3, G5 CAO, DEP CH OPS UNMOs	

MESSAGE

REF BHC MAIN (COS) FAX 0° 1135A NOV 93.

1. MISSION AT REFERENCE HAS RECEIVED CLEARANCE FROM THE BSA.

2. SECTOR SARAJEVO TASKED TO EXECUTE AS PER DETAILS AT REFERENCE ENSURING ESCORT DONE AS PER NORMAL SOPs

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Appendix VI

Report on the incident by French Battalion 2

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

SECTOR SARAJEVO

8 November 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Staff, Sector Sarajevo

FROM : Colonel de RICHOUFFTZ de MANIN
Commander, FREBAT-2

DATE : 8 November 1993

Subject: Ambush of an UNPROFOR escort at RAJLOVAC checkpoint (north SARAJEVO).

On 8 November 1993, the French Infantry Battalion 2 stationed at the Sarajevo airport received the mission of transporting the Archbishop of Sarajevo to Vares. The Archbishop was accompanied by three clergymen and two bodyguards.

The mission was ordered by the UNPROFOR CP of Kiseljak in the afternoon of 7 november 1993 (see attached document). The estimatd itinerary to be followed as indicated on the document is as follows:

- SARAJEVO-RAJLOVAC-BREZA-VARES

Chronological events:

0800 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL, heading the detachment of two APCs armed with 12,7 took the following persons:

- VAB 1: - His Highness Puljic - Mr Andjelovic - Mr Lucic; and

- VAB 2: - His Highness Tomasevic - Mr Dejanovic - Mr Andzic.

Each VAB consisted of a driver, group leader and four soldiers with two commanding the rear exits.

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0820 hours - Heading out of Sarajevo, the Bosnian checkpoint was crossed, although with some difficulty, moreover it seemed that the Chief of the local post was ignorant of the "clearance".

0845 hours - arriving at the Serbian checkpoint of RAJLOVAC they were held by the militia. The inspection of the identity cards was carried out from the windows of the armoured APCs. At the request of the head militiaman, the two APCs were forced to pack at the other side of the checkpoint.

0900 hours - Moving with about 10 armed militiamen and threatening around the APC. The pretext of the menace and lateness seemed to be aimed at the request for gasoil before crossing. After verification it was realized that a VBL was stopped in addition to the two APCs. They blocked the doors of the second VAB. Another VAB (VAB 3) sensing danger, went under cover 70 metres from the spot.

0905 hours - The battalion commander ordered the escort team to make a U-turn and head back to Sarajevo. The Serbian forces (militia and police force) composed of groups took position around the escort party with anti-tank weapons and calibres. The anti-tank weapons (missiles and rockets) were aimed at the armed UNPROFOR French vehicles present. About 10 Serbes on the causeway, encircled the three leading vehicles, with other serbian vehicles blocking the passage.

0915 hours - With the beginning of discussions in danger, the serbian militiamen denounced the presence of two criminals belonging to special Croat forces in the ambushed delegation. All talks, under the threat of fire being opened, continued till 1100 hours. The Serbs gave a warning thrice for the handing over of the two persons (Mrssrs Andzic and Dejarovic) in two minutes or else face fire being opened on and destroying altogether the APCs and the personnel in the VAB.

1030 hours - The ground was yet reinforced with four additional anti-tanks (two belonging to the forces of the Serbian army).

1200 hours - With combined action of COMSECTOR, the battalion and the elements on the spot, the anti-tanks were withdrawn. After talks between PALE and Kiseljak, tension reduced with assurances of a favourable outcome.

1500 hours - A more hardening situation ensued as a result of delay in talks and a refusal by the UNPROFOR escort party to release the two persons to the Serbs. Hence, a new ultimatum was again addressed to the French for a favourable outcome before the night.

1530 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL, head of the escort group, who was involved in talks with the militia was suppressed and threatened with several weapons, with a pistol aimed at his stomach. At this point, Staff Seageant TAINO, assistant junior officer, who wanted to interrupt was equally suppressed and threatened. Seageant DOBSA, junior officer and interpreter (serbo-croate) was also suppressed. An order was then given to Lieutenant BOURNEL to make open the rear doors of the APCs and to handover the two persons. Lieutenant BOURNEL opposes to the detriment of his life.

1545 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL then informed the battalion for the last time. The Battalion Commander ordered him not to open the doors, but to continue talks no matter the outcome.

1600 hours - The militia excited at this time, reinforced and encouraged by other elements (CHETNIKS) arriving from RAJLOVAC raised the second VAB and with the help of iron bars broke the two outer openings, after efforts to open the main doors proved futile. They then forced out the two persons and whisked them away in a car. The entire Serbian defence system was high in a matter of minutes.

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1630 hours - By order, the entire detachment made a U-turn and returned back to the airport without hesitation.

REMARKS:

1. It is without doubt that the UNPROFOR detachment entrusted with the escort of the persons was ambushed:

- The Serbian checkpoint was informed well in advance before the vehicles approached it;

- Taking into account the military defence system on the ground, the number and variety of armour observed and the short intervals with which they reacted, it is confirmed that the ambush was premeditated;

- The link between the capturing serbian parties: militia, police and army was observed the whole day long.

2. The Chief of Section and of the escort detachment team executed orders given to them and did not at any given moment give in to oppression thereby putting in danger the persons under their responsibility.

3. The proximity and threat of open of fire in all the above circumstances, the unfavorable use of force on a difficult ground not permitting manocuvreing would have been mistaken for a useless massacre.

Appendix VII

Report on the incident by Bosnia and Herzegovina Command

HQ BH COMMAND MAIN OFFICE OF CON

Page 1 of 5

[redacted] FLASH

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	
[redacted]	

[redacted]

1. Attached is a copy of a fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina sent at 1514 hrs on Saturday 06 Nov. An earlier request had been made by telephone.

2. Lengthy telephone discussions between the Ministry, HQ Command, and BSA Commander General Mladic ensued. General Mladic gave approval in principle but wished to know details of who the delegation consisted of. They were as follows:

a. Monsignor VINKO PULJIC.

b. Fra PETAR ANDJELOVIC.

c. Fra LJUBO LUCIC.

d. IVO TOMASEVIC.

e. PERUO DEJANOVIC - security.

f. JOZO ANDZIC - security.

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These details were given to BSA Major Indic at Lukavica, and confirmed through the UNMO link at Pale. A copy of the confirmation is attached. There was insufficient time to send the delegation on the date required, so all timings were deferred 24 hrs.

3. At 0800 hrs Monday 00 Nov, the delegation was collected from the Presidency by a FREBAT 2 convoy of 1 VBL and 2 VAB armoured personnel carriers, which move through the Moslem check points at KAZLOVAC at about 0830 hrs.

THE INCIDENT

4. As soon as the convoy arrived at the Serb check point at KAZLOVAC, it was blocked front and rear by Serb tanks. The Serb police at the check point insisted on arresting JOZO ANDZIC whom they accused of war crimes. The FREBAT 2 escort refused to let the Serbs into the vehicles and a lengthy stand-off began while negotiations were carried out at escalating levels by Chief Sector Sarajevo, COS HQ Command, CMO (Mr Andrew) and HQ UNPROFOR. Mr Andrew moved first to BUDOZOK and then to the PTT building in Sarajevo to continue negotiations at close hand, but senior Serb military personnel and politicians were not available. The Serb interlocutor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs official) insisted that the Serbs must arrest ANDZIC.

5. Further investigations with Mr MILIC (Deputy, adviser to the President of the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina) revealed that ANDZIC is the head of a Special Bosnian Police unit called "JATD" which has responsibilities for internal security under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. The task of this unit is apparently the maintenance of internal security within Sarajevo. This information was not told to UNPROFOR at the time of the initial request for the movement of the delegation. The Serbs have indicated that ANDZIC was trying to escape Sarajevo in an UNPROFOR APC.

6. Meanwhile on the ground the situation remained tense but at a stalemate throughout the day. At various times the APC's were threatened by Serb personnel and UNPROFOR armoured cars were placed in a readiness position at a discreet distance from the check point.

7. At 1630 hrs, the Serbs at the check point issued an ultimatum that ANDZIC be handed over or they would open fire on the detained UNPROFOR vehicles. This was refused and COS HQC ordered the reaction force to move up to the check point.

8. At about 1640 hrs a group of Serbs believed to be from the Ministry of the Interior, armed with crowbars, broke open the doors of the APC and dragged out two men (PERDO DEJANOVIC and JOZO ANDZIC) who were taken away, possibly to the barracks at ILIDZA.

9. All three APC's were released with the remainder of the four

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delegates. All returned to Sarajevo.

18. CCS BHC reported the situation to Vice President Dr. Ejub GANIC, who replied in well spoken english "You are responsible for what might happen to these people. You had enough time, you have aircraft. It is the full responsibility of your people to protect them". Later on BH Prime Minister Mr. SIJLADZIC called CAC Andreev and requested him to deal with this situation urgently.

COMMENT

19. The circumstances of this ambush are still not clear. In particular, it is not known who gave the orders for this kidnapping, nor to what degree the Serb army was involved.

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Attachment 1



Attachment II

Sector Sarajevo report on the incident

SECTEUR SARAJEVO
H.Q

LCL FEUTREN YVES
SMIO

SARAJEVO
LE 08 NOVEMBRE 1993

FICHE

Les deux "agents de sécurité" arrêtés par les serbes cet après-midi ne sont pas des policiers de petit calibre :

JOZO ANDZIC le chef de la force LASTVA et
FERDO DEJANOVIC le chef d'état-major du MUP.

- La force LASTVA "HIRONDELLE" est une unité autonome spéciale, d'environ 400 personnes, chargée de missions comme le nettoyage des 9 et 10ème brigades il y a quinze jours.
Elle travaille par commandos de 6 à 10 personnels, habillés de tenues sombres et cagoulés. La force disposerait d'un véhicule blindé style police armé de 12,7mm.
- La MUP constitue la police politique du régime, au nombre d'environ 300 personnels (anciens policiers et athlètes).

On peut se demander ce que faisaient ces deux personnages de haut rang dans la suite de l'archevêque : 3 hypothèses :

H1 - L'archevêque a été victime d'un chantage : voyage à VARES contre exfiltration des deux chefs.

H2 - Embuscade contre ces deux chefs d'origine croate de la part des bosniaques : en effet leurs noms figuraient sur la "clearance" demandée aux serbes.

H3 - Mission spéciale de ces deux chefs à VARES (ANDZIC est originaire de cette ville ou y aurait de la famille).

Si H3 s'avérait vrai, ce serait tout bénéfice pour les bosniaques, débarrassés de chefs croates encombrants, discréditant archevêque et UNPROFOR, tout cela sur le compte des serbes.

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Appendix VIII

UNPROFOR headquarters report on the incident

UNPROFOR

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: C752	DATE: 08/11/93
TO: BOUTROS-GHALI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: STOLTENBERG/ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX NO.:
ATTN: BOUTROS-GHALI ANNAN GOULDING COT	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER: BRIG RITCHIE COS
INFO: FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: FORCIBLE REMOVAL BY BOSNIAN SERB FORCES OF TWO MUSLIMS FROM AN UNPROFOR VEHICLE	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, HCA, DPC, COS, ACOS (O&P), PIO	

MESSAGE

A serious incident has taken place at a Bosnian Serb checkpoint at RAILOVAC North West of SARAJEVO where a delegation from SARAJEVO en route to VARES travelling in three FREBAT 2 armoured vehicles were blocked at 0830 hours 8 Nov by two Serbian tanks, one placed at either end of the convoy. After all day negotiations to release the convoy an ultimatum was given to hand over a member of the delegation, a Mr JOZO ANDZIC, or the Serbians would open fire.

Before the ultimatum expired, the Serbians forced open the rear door of one of the VABs, aimed their rifles at the French soldiers and dragged out Mr JOZO ANDZIC and Mr FERDO DEJTANOVIC. They are believed to have been taken to the nearby Serbian Barracks at RAILOVAC. All Serb forces have now withdrawn and the convoy has returned to Sarajevo.

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I was first made aware of this incident by Brigadier Ritchie who is Acting Force Commander at 1540 hours. This was within 5 minutes of his first learning of this incident from BH Command. I immediately telephoned President Milosovic to seek his good offices to release the convoy.

I was kept abreast of developments and at 1620 hours was told that the Serbs had forced entry into one of the VABs and removed the two men at gun point. Milosovic agreed to seek their early release.

At 1840 hours President Milosovic called back and informed me that one man had been released, that only one man was now kept under arrest, and that this man was a notorious war criminal who had travelled under false name.

What is quite clear is that this was a deliberate ambush on the UNPROFOR party as General Mladic had personally cleared the convoy on 7 November and knew precisely who was on board. The person they were after was Mr JOZO ANDZIC who is the head of a Special Police Unit of the BH Ministry of the Interior believed to be called LASTA.

The other members of the delegation were

Monsignor	MIKO	PULJIC
Father	PETAR	ANDJELOVIC
Father	LJUBO	LUCIC
Mr	IVO	TOMASEVIC

A full report will follow once all details have been clearly established.